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Abstract:　 Increases in drug trafficking bound for the United States force the nation’s law enforcement authorities
to seek international cooperation, especially through extradition procedures to take fugitives into custody. The
research aims to illustrate the difficulties in extradition process through case study and to specify the scope of
extradition and extraterritorial law enforcement. This paper also discusses the feasibility of some alternatives to
extradition that are less offensive to sovereignty, namely, conducting arrest activities in international waters or in a
third state.
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Introduction
The transnational characteristic of crimes has become one sig-
nificant phenomenon of numerous criminal activities in modern
era. In other words, although an incident might occur only on the
street or in a particular neighborhood in one state, it could have
transnational roots and could flow easily across borders.1 For
instance, certain illicit substances, while sold in the United States,
are actually supplied through foreign sources, as the movement of
people and illegal goods can proceed seamlessly from state to
state.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that, to control and respond
to these transnational crimes, law enforcement authorities from
one state must involve their counterparts from another state,
whether the other state is willing or not. To illustrate, if a suspect
is located on foreign soil, he must be captured there before being
transferred to the United States to accomplish the ultimate pur-
pose of law enforcement, i.e., to bring him to stand trial for his
crimes. Cooperation between states, therefore, is imperative, due
to the transnational nature of modern crime, which makes individ-
ual states incapable of effectively combating cross-border crimes.
To obtain custody of alleged suspects from foreign soil to the
United States, there are a number of available options. Among
these, the most widely accepted method is extradition, as it is gen-
erally recognized as the most lawful and formal route to transfer a
suspect from one state to another. Meanwhile, compared to the
movement of fugitives and controlled substances (i.e., they often
are able to move across border swiftly), the extradition procedure
through diplomatic channels seems to most to be time-consuming,
which has been described as“a creaking steam engine” and even
“horse and buggy.”2
In the case that these so-called bureaucratic extradition proce-
dures end in failure, or when one state wants to sidestep them,
extraterritorial arrest activities have been used as a last resort to
catch individuals suspected of drug trafficking and, more often, of
terrorism.3 In the lacuna between the needs for speedy law
enforcement and the inefficiency of formal extradition, these
activities, through which defendants are rendered to the court,
have been described as both “fascinating and notorious.”4 These
methods are criticized by many law theorists as well as the tar-
geted states as a violation of territorial sovereignty; they have
often even been equated to abduction.5
Certainly, there are different perspectives concerning how
states should address and respond to this threat to both national
and international security. Due to the seriousness of organized
cross-border drug trafficking, international cooperation to handle
this type of crime is notably mature. In the case of the United
States, the Department of Justice has cultivated close relation-
ships with its foreign counterparts.6 Its enduring efforts to transfer
suspects who are staying outside of the United States territories
are bearing fruit immensely.
Despite this, there are other areas in which contentions still
exist within the international community. For instance, in October
1989, the United States Department of Justice was harshly criti-
cized by the international community because of its recognition of
legal authority in apprehension of suspects on foreign soil without
the host country’s consent.7 If it remains unresolved, this is also a
thorny problem that will deter effective drug trafficking control. 
In this article, we will delve into how states should control drug
trafficking through the case study of Christopher Coke’s extradi-
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tion. Because of its complexities, this case epitomizes the intense
and tenacious determination of the United States law enforcement
authorities in bringing suspects residing outside of the United
States to justice.8
I.  Increase in Drug Trafficking
Before scrutinizing the issues surrounding extradition, it is fit-
ting to illustrate both the barriers obstructing the promotion of
international cooperation in extradition and the complications of
drug trafficking control caused by the increase in drug trafficking.
A. Definition and Structure of Drug Trafficking 
From a law enforcement perspective, drug trafficking refers to
almost any acts that facilitate the distribution of controlled sub-
stance,9 i.e., any type of drug whose possession and use is regu-
lated by law, including narcotics.10 More specifically, trafficking
is defined as the act of illegally producing, importing, selling, or
supplying significant amounts of a controlled substance.
In the 1980s, the United States became aware that attempts to
intercept the flow of drugs along its borders, while ongoing, had
only experienced marginal success.11 Since then, drug trafficking
has taken on a transnational dimension, which has become com-
mon knowledge.12 In 2010, National Drug Threat Assessment
2010 stated that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations con-
stituted the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States.13
To fight these transnational organized criminal activities, apply-
ing supply-focused enforcement is the priority. Certainly, to put
this type of control policy into practice, cooperation from all of
the countries concerned is indispensable.
Since drug trafficking is considered by the United States as
being simultaneously a criminal act and political threat,14 the
United States has responded to these threats to its national secu-
rity with military measures, namely, the use of military personnel
to assist in the apprehension of suspected drug traffickers on for-
eign soil. For instance, in December of 1981, Congress enacted a
law that sanctioned the use of armed forces in drug enforcement.
By 1986, the United States likened the import of illegal drugs into
the country to armed attacks.15 In November of 1989, legal advi-
sor to the Department of State, Mr. Abraham Sofaer, in his testi-
mony to the United States Congress, mentioned that drug
traffickers had been trained in terrorism tactics.16
Because of the complexity, seriousness, and transnationality of
drug trafficking and the criminal organizations that engage in it,
efforts in curtailing it have yielded very few results, despite the
response of the Mexican government to confront the drug cartels.
This quandary symbolizes the difficulty of international drug traf-
ficking control.
B. Structure of Drug Trafficking
The border region shared by the United States and Mexico has
experienced much gruesome strife between the Gulf Cartel and
the Zetas, criminal organizations that are active in the area.17
Since the summer of 2010, the Mexican authorities have discov-
ered at least 145 bodies in mass graves in the vicinity of the US-
Mexican border, especially near San Fernando, Mexico. Tamauli-
pas, where San Fernando is located, is virtually controlled by the
Gulf Cartel and the Zetas, not by the Mexican government. The
region is contested because there is an extended highway, which
can be used as an efficient drug trafficking route into the United
States, as San Fernando is situated just 90 miles south of Browns-
ville, Texas. As a result, the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas have a tight
control on the area, specifically the key roads. To the United
States, this situation is likened to an“insurgency” that deprives
the Mexican government of control on its territories, borrowing
the words of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.18 
To appear to gain a handle on the disorganized situation in
Tamaulipas, the Mexican Interior Minister, Francisco Blake
Mora, vowed to stabilize the region by increasing the deployment
of military personnel, sweeping the cartels from the routes in San
Fernando, and capturing the murderers. The Mexican government
carried out these promises after the authorities had found 72
remains in graves near San Fernando in August 2010. In fact, the
Mexican authorities suspected that the Zetas had committed the
killing of these 72 migrants, who were abducted from a bus bound
for the United States. Nonetheless, it is questionable that the 17
suspects detained would be properly prosecuted by the Mexican
government.
The Mexican government’s efforts to stabilize its northern bor-
der, therefore, are widely considered as insufficient. Furthermore,
the cartels’ successes have created deep rifts and distrust between
Mexico and the United States. This mistrust was demonstrated
through the leaked diplomatic cables of the American Ambassa-
dor to Mexico Carlos Pascual, criticizing the inadequacy and
reluctance of the Mexican government’s fight against organized
crime. The incident eventually prompted the American ambassa-
dor to resign.19
This is a prime example of how failed attempts of transnational
organized crime control lead to a rupture of international coopera-
tion and vice versa. 
C. The United States Border and Drug Trafficking
As it is the stage of much transnational drug trafficking, special
mention should be made of the border of the United States.
Because the United States shares its borders with Canada and
Mexico, all of which are countries of substantial size, their bound-
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aries are especially long, which understandably have become the
locus of drug law enforcement interests and concerns. Further-
more, drug trafficking techniques have become much more
advanced to adapt to new drug control methods.20 The majority of
the illegal drugs smuggled from their points of production to the
United States arrive by land21 through the porous borders with
Canada and Mexico.22
 Figures 1 through 423 depict the amount of narcotics seized by
federal authorities in 2008. It is clear that the states on the south-
west and northeast borders bear the effects of drug trafficking
much more than their inland counterparts. 
II.  Legal Frameworks for Extradition
To counter such a severe crime as drug trafficking, it is impera-
tive to establish legal frameworks for cooperation. This section is
dedicated to exploring how these instruments are used by the
authorities.
A. Procedures for Extradition
1. Definition and Procedures for Extradition
a. Definition of Extradition
There are a number of available options for obtaining custody
of alleged suspects. Among these, the most widely-accepted
Fig.1  Federal Marijuana Seizures 2008
Fig.2  Federal Heroin Seizures 2008
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method is extradition.24 Extradition is defined as the official sur-
render of an alleged criminal by one state to another, which has
jurisdiction over the crime.25 Since crimes might not necessarily
be committed entirely within only one state, such as the tradi-
tional example of firing a gun across border,26 extradition func-
tions as a means for gaining custody of a suspect residing in a
foreign country.  
As such, extradition is recognized as the lawful and formal
route to take a suspect into custody; on the other hand, it is often
criticized as bureaucratic and not fulfilling all of the needs of law
enforcement authorities. As a result, it is at times avoided by
them. The reasons might be related to the procedures for extradi-
tion.
b. Procedures for Extradition
The first reason pertains to the pragmatic aspect of extradition.
In general, extradition procedures are overly time-consuming for
gaining custody of suspects. The reason for this is that the extradi-
tion process is managed and controlled, not by law enforcement
authorities directly, but by foreign ministries. For example, in the
United States, it is handled by the Department of State. Often, due
to the different duties of law enforcement and diplomacy, there
are some discrepancy in the willingness and enthusiasm between
the two to carry it out. As a consequence, this disagreement pre-
sents itself as an oft-unseen obstacle for smooth extradition.27
The second reason concerns the customary rule of international
law on extradition. Extradition is not part of customary interna-
Fig.4  Federal Cocaine Seizures 2008
Fig.3  Federal Meth Seizures 2008
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tional law. Therefore, without an extradition treaty between the
requesting and requested countries, the latter has no legal obliga-
tions to extradite any suspects to the former.  Thus, whether the
requested country will extradite the suspect is based solely on its
diplomatic courtesy or the matter of comity.28 
The third reason involves the legal conditions provided in the
extradition treaty and the domestic statutes of the requested coun-
try. Of these, the most disputed is the nationality exception, which
prohibits governments from extraditing their own nationals. Many
countries have sanctioned this condition as a provision of their
constitutions.  Particularly, the United States law enforcement
authorities suffered from this rule that prevented them from
apprehending Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers even
though they would not be prosecuted in their own countries due to
their governments being corrupted at one time. Yet these two
countries eliminated its nationality exception under the pressure
of the United States.29
2. Extradition Treaties
Usually, extradition is processed bilaterally. The United States
and Mexico concluded Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Mexico of 1980.30 Article 9 of this treaty provided that
parties be not required to extradite their nationals, but be able to
prosecute those nationals in their own courts.  Still, due to the
problem of Mexican government and law enforcement authorities
once colluding with drug traffickers, as in Colombia, the suspects
were from time to time not prosecuted.
Understandably, due to the dire need to curb drug trafficking,
the United States government petitioned the Mexican government
hard to enable extradition of their nationals. By virtue of this
endeavor, in 1996, the Mexican government extradited two sus-
pects who had trafficked drugs into the United States. On January
18, 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice held that the
extradition of nationals is constitutional.
Regarding the circumstances between the United States and
Colombia, they concluded an extradition treaty that enabled them
to extradite their respective nationals in 1979. Before the imple-
mentation of the treaty, because of the fact that the Colombian
government was involved in drug trafficking, traffickers were nei-
ther arrested nor prosecuted by their own government. This treaty
was declared by the Colombian court as unconstitutional; how-
ever, as the judiciary cannot readily nullify treaties, the extradi-
tion treaty remains effective. Indeed, two drug traffickers were
extradited to the United States in the year when the treaty went
into force.
B. Practice of the Extradition
Despite the aforementioned obstacles, the extradition of Chris-
topher Michael Coke from Jamaica to the United States was suc-
cessful. As it is usually the case, formal extradition process needs
persistent and enduring attempts. Actually, from the request of the
United States to the arrival of Coke in New York, this case took 9
months. Nevertheless, the Jamaican government, who initially
was not willing to extradite Coke, finally issued an arrest warrant
for Coke, and extradited him to the United States. This case
should be examined closely.
1. Extradition of Christopher Coke
In August of 2009, the United States Department of Justice
announced an official request for the arrest and extradition of
Coke.
a. Background and Summary of Facts
Coke was the leader of an international criminal organization,
the Shower Posse, which with close to 5,000 members in Jamaica
and the United States since the early 1990s. Its name derived from
its engaging in showering shootouts. Coke, a Jamaican citizen,
was listed on the Consolidated Priority Organization Targets
(CPOTs) roster by the Department of Justice. Since he directed
his members to sell marijuana and crack cocaine in the New York
area, and also armed his organization with trafficked firearms,
Coke was charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics and con-
spiracy to traffic firearms.
To begin proceedings of his apprehension, the United States
officially requested by Diplomatic Note No. 296 on August 25,
2009 that the Jamaican authorities arrested Coke and extradited
him to the United States Southern District Court in New York to
face charges. 
After 9 months of negotiating with the United States govern-
ment, the Minister of Justice of Jamaica Dorothy Lightbourne
eventually signed off on the authority to proceed for the arrest of
Coke on May 18, 2010. Subsequently, the Jamaican government
carried out a large-scale operation that attempted to capture Coke
but it resulted in 73 deaths. However, Coke ultimately surren-
dered himself to the United States embassy and was extradited.
b. Legal Basis of Extradition
The Extradition Treaty between the Government of Jamaica
and the Government of the United States of America, signed on
June 14, 1983, outlines the legal protocols required for formal
extradition of criminals. Under this treaty, the Government of
Jamaica is entitled to request information on evidence and charges
additional to that submitted by the Government of the United
States.31 Therefore, on September 18, 2009, the Jamaican govern-
ment exercised that discretion regarding the Coke Case, because it
viewed the evidence preliminarily presented was insufficient to
justify the issuance of the arrest warrant. 
We will examine the Jamaican government’s assertion in detail
below.
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2. The Negotiation between the United States and Jamaica
a. The Jamaican Government’s Standpoint 
As convention dictates, the extradition requests from the
United States are processed in a smooth and prompt fashion by
the Jamaican government in accordance with the Extradition
Treaty and Treaty between the United States and Jamaica on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.32 In other words,
the Jamaican government is by and large cooperative with the
United States in extradition. As a result, the Jamaican government
claimed in this case that it was willing to cooperate in extraditing
one of its nationals even when it is authorized by its constitution
to decline the extradition of its nationals. However, it appeared
reluctant to extradite Coke through reiterating that the evidence
submitted initially was insufficient to grant the extradition
request.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister of Jamaica Bruce Golding
explained the reasons for refusal of extradition in a Statement to
Parliament on May 11, 2010, just one week before the date when
the Minister of Justice signed the authorization to proceed on May
18, 2010. According to the Prime Minister’s statement, the
arrangements between the United States and Jamaica allowed
information sharing not for judicial purposes, but only for specific
purposes mentioned by Article 16 (9) of the Interception of Com-
munications Act33. Consequently, the Jamaican government
requested that the United States provide additional information
that would enable the Minister to fulfill the request and to sign the
authorization. He also stressed that if such action was taken,
Jamaica would extradite Coke. This view was consistent with that
of Jamaican Minister of Justice Dorothy Lightbourne’s, as
expressed on her official website on a page dedicated to the Coke
case, Chronology of Events Leading to the Extradition of Christo-
pher Coke.34
According to Minister of Justice Lightbourne’s assertions, the
Government of Jamaica was required to seek further information,
precisely, the identity of the cooperating witnesses, and other evi-
dence as to how the United States obtained “intercepted
communications”, which was a request made under the provisions
of the Mutual Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act (MACMA) to
justify extradition of its nationals. The United States stood its
ground on that the evidence submitted in the original request was
sufficient to proceed and that the evidence had been obtained in
accordance with the mutual understandings between the Jamaican
and United States law enforcement authorities. 
Under these circumstances, the Minister of Justice ultimately
exercised the executive discretion and signed the authority to pro-
ceed on May 18, 2010, citing consideration of “public interest”,
according to her website.
b. The United States’ Response
The United States, like the Jamaican government, also recog-
nizes that the relationship between the United States and Jamaica
has usually been collaborative. Despite the complicated issues
involved in Coke’s extradition, their partnership for combating
organized crime remains strong, as demonstrated by a speech of
Attorney General Mr. Eric Holder, which was given at the Inau-
gural Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue on Carib-
bean-United States Security Initiative on May 27, 2010.35 He
stressed that drug trafficking and organized crime is expanding
across the Western Hemisphere, as criminals know no borders.
Therefore, to cope with this problem, the most powerful tool is
the partnership between the Caribbean countries and the United
States. He strongly advocated for establishing a legal framework
that all countries should embrace through multilateral agreements,
such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.36 In addition to
these tools, he also suggested the use of bilateral mutual legal
assistance and extradition treaties to combat transnational crimes.
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)
of 2011 also concludes that this extradition case did not hinder the
close cooperation between the Jamaican Government and the
United States government in efforts to curb narcotics and related
transnational crimes.
As a result, this case should be considered the prime example
of sovereign states’ willingness to reconcile different perspectives
on extradition of a specific individual and to reach a successful
outcome in controlling organized crime. With reiterating that the
information was sufficient, the United States persisted in petition-
ing for the extradition of Coke. In the end, the Jamaican govern-
ment extradited Coke, even when it had not been given the further
information requested of the United States. 
Meanwhile, the concerns of the United States were not only
whether the extradition would be successful, but also, during this
prolonged negotiation, whether he would be killed by some other
concerned parties. Accordingly, two other options were simulta-
neously considered by the authorities as well.
One was to lure Coke from Jamaica into international waters.
Another was to lure him into a third state. Both would be carried
out through informants, in other words, surrogates, because this
method is generally viewed as less offensive to the host’s sover-
eignty. In light of past practice, in the case that the operation is
achieved peacefully, the host country, in the present case,
Jamaica, which did not want to be directly involved with extradi-
tion matters, would only need to give its tacit acquiescence.
The following section will be dedicated to the theory and prac-
tice of extraterritorial law enforcement.
III.  Theory and Practice
As mentioned, due to the procedures for extradition, law
enforcement authorities occasionally have to resort to the alterna-
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tives. One controversial alternative is abduction of suspects on
foreign soil. International law prohibits states from sending their
agents into another state to apprehend fugitives without the host
state’s consent. To examine this issue, it is essential to cite some
cases.
A. Alternatives to the Extradition
1. Cases in the United States
a. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine emerged from two United States
Supreme Court judgments, Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins.37
The court held that, although the defendant’s custody may have
been unlawfully taken by the authorities, the prosecution is not
necessarily dismissed.
b.  The United States v. Alvarez-Machain 
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine was reaffirmed in 1992 in the United
States v. Alvarez-Machain,38 where the defendant was kidnapped
by Mexican citizens from Guadalajara, Mexico to El Paso, Texas
on April 2, 1990. The Supreme Court held that defendant may not
be prosecuted due to the manner with which he had been brought
into the United States. On the other hand, it also stated that the
existence of an extradition treaty does not necessarily imply pro-
hibition of abduction.
c. The United States v. Noriega39  
The capture of General Manuel Antonio Noriega on drug
charges by means of invasion of Panama did not bar prosecution.
He was indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami.  The alleged
crime was international conspiracy to import cocaine into the
United States, violating federal laws. The issue on extraterritorial
law enforcement in this case was whether the invasion of Panama
and the subsequent arrest of Noriega violated Panama’s territorial
sovereignty and whether the United States had jurisdiction over
Noriega’s alleged criminal activities.
The point of Noriega’s assertion was the issue of applicable
international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction to indict acts com-
mitted by foreign nationals on foreign soil.  Since Noriega was
charged with providing safe haven to drug traffickers, manufac-
turing and shipment of cocaine bound for the United States, the
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction whether the United States may
prosecute the person who has not committed these illegal acts in
the United States emerged. Defendant claimed that, in light of
established principle of international law, exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction on Noriega’s acts was not possible. 
The United States district court held that Noriega’s acts in Pan-
ama had a direct effect within the United States, and thus, extra-
territorial jurisdiction in this case was appropriate from standpoint
of international law.
Often, a state that resorts to extraterritorial law enforcement is
usually criticized harshly for“a more extreme violation of
sovereignty”40 by both the international community and the tar-
geted country itself. Still, Operation Golden Rod, which was
aimed to capture Fawaz Yunis was not condemned by other coun-
tries. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine this case closely to
determine what distinguishes this case from other similar ones
that have been seriously chastised by the international commu-
nity.
d. The United States v. Fawaz Yunis41
Yunis was a citizen of Lebanon and accused of hijacking a Jor-
danian passenger plane in Beirut, Labanon. Three Americans
were aboard. After the incident, the United States persevered in
pursuing Yunis, who was on the run. As a result, in 1987, agents
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DEA lured
him onto a yacht in the Mediterranean Sea with the promise of a
drug deal by agent provocateur. When the vessel entered the
international waters off the shore of Cyprus, they arrested Yunis
and transferred him to the United States.
After being convicted of conspiracy, hostage taking, and air
piracy by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, Yunis appealed, claiming that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion over him. His reasoning was twofold. The first point focused
on the nexus between his acts and the territories of the United
States; the United States may not apply its own laws to offenses
committed by a nonresident alien on foreign soil. The second
point focused on the method through which he had been brought
to the United States; the use of extraterritorial enforcement by
agent provocateur was unlawful. In short, the jurisdictional issues
in this case were whether a state could apply its laws to acts com-
mitted by a foreign national outside of its territories and whether
extraterritorial arrest activities were lawful.
To address the first argument, the court found that a state may
punish non-nationals for crimes committed against its nationals
outside of its territory. According to the reasoning of the court, the
statute in question in the present case, the Destruction of Aircraft
Act42, extended jurisdiction over an alleged saboteur who com-
mitted crimes against aircraft located in foreign airspace and was
later found in the United States.  Additionally, the court noted that
the Hostage Taking Act43 specified that one circumstance in
which a suspect could be charged for an offense occurring outside
the United States was when an American was taken hostage.  This
Act provides expressly that when an American was taken hostage,
a suspect could be charged no matter where the act is committed.
With regard to the second argument, the court determined that
whether the suspect was forcibly renditioned to the United States
or located after he voluntarily entered its territories did not bar its
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 1203(b)(1)(B) of the Hostage Taking
Act provides that as long as the offender is found within the
United States, regardless of what manner this was achieved, s/he
Mika OKOCHI14
can be charged by the authorities. Therefore, whether Yunis was
brought by force or found within the United States was immate-
rial.
Moreover, to strengthen this reasoning, the court interpreted
that there was a congressional intent to authorize the prosecution
of those who took American hostages no matter where the offense
occurred or where the offender was found. This legal framework
was also consistent with the United States’ treaty obligations,
which were instituted after the ratification of the International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages. Generally, this type
of multilateral anti-terrorism treaties accepts the passive personal-
ity principle. Under this principle, states may assert jurisdiction
over offenses committed against their citizens overseas.44 In con-
clusion, the court had jurisdiction over Yunis.
In this case, two issues were specified. First, the court is indif-
ferent to whether a suspect has been brought to the United States
forcibly or has voluntarily come over by himself. Second, the
arrest activities on international waters do not construe, by defini-
tion, a violation of territorial sovereignty. In contrast, customary
international law is interpreted that it is strictly prohibited for any
state to exercise enforcement jurisdiction outside of its territory,
which involves investigation by police agencies and any physical
arrests of suspects. This is the principle of territoriality.
2. Customary Rules of International Law
The customary rule of international law was framed by the S. S.
Lotus Case (France v. Turkey).45  On August 2, 1926, the Lotus, a
French mail steamer, had collided with the Boz-Kourt, a Turkish
collier. When the Lotus arrived at Constantinople, Turkish author-
ities arrested a French officer, Demons.  The French objected that
his acts were completed on the French ship on the high seas;
therefore, Turkish law could not be applied to his actions. The
Turkish and French governments agreed to submit this case to the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). 
The PCIJ ruled in favor of the Turkish government, stating that
Turkish law enforcement had the jurisdiction to prosecute Officer
Demons. In the reasoning for this decision, the PCIJ analyzed the
legal rules on extraterritorial jurisdiction. The reasoning, which is
widely-accepted, articulates that states may extend the application
of their laws unless restrained by a prohibitory rule of interna-
tional law. However, this understanding is limited to prescriptive
jurisdiction. In contrast to this type of jurisdiction, enforcement
jurisdiction on foreign soil by other states should be strictly pro-
hibited by international customary law, unless allowed by a per-
missive rule of international law, and thus should be regarded as a
serious violation of sovereignty. In other words, enforcement
jurisdiction is limited to being within the border by the territorial
principle still.
Thus, international law and the international community have
traditionally been reluctant to recognize extraterritorial enforce-
ment jurisdiction. Yet, with September 11, the argument for extra-
territorial law enforcement has gained more proponents,
particularly in counter-terrorism measures, as the following quote
illustrates. 
“If a non-state terrorist group attacks a state from a safe haven
in another host state that will not or cannot take action against the
non-state armed group, the attacked state may employ armed
force against the terrorist group within the borders of the host
state. Extraterritorial law enforcement is not an attack on the host
state, but on its parasitical terrorist group.”46
More generally, the International Court of Justice Judge Rosa-
lyn Higgins comments on the S. S. Lotus Case decision, as fol-
lows:
“I believe that the key to the issue lies in the protection of com-
mon values rather than the innovation of state sovereignty for its
own sake.... The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to that end
seems to me as acceptable as its exercise in the other non-territo-
rial bases of jurisdiction.”47
Evidently, drug trafficking is also universally condemned;
therefore, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e. legislation
of long-arm laws,48 is not objected by the international commu-
nity,49 since such legislation itself does not necessarily violate the
sovereignty of foreign countries. However, once it reaches the
stage of taking enforcement actions in another country, there have
been objections over the application of these long-arm narcotics
laws,50 as it might be construed as a violation of the territorial sov-
ereignty of the foreign country. In consequence, the feasibility of
extraterritorial arrest activities is still unknown. 
B. Scope and Limits of Extradition
Having scrutinized the practice of extradition and extraterrito-
rial law enforcement, it is apparent that extradition functions
effectively enough by virtue of the effort of the authorities. Yet,
controversial arrest activities, though rare, still exist. These cases
and materials illustrate the scope and limits of extradition and the
availability of alternatives to extradition.
As a matter of principle, law enforcement authorities seek the
cooperation of other states as a top priority when extraditing sus-
pects. They eschew infringing on the territorial sovereignty of the
host state.51 Reflecting on the magnitude of the international
reaction52 caused by the extraterritorial activities, therefore, they
consider these acts as a final resort, or the worst case scenario.
Nevertheless, failure is not an option. While the authorities
exercise great restraint, they are sometimes compelled to prepare
alternatives to extradition due to the wide discrepancy between
the territorial principle and the needs for law enforcement. Thus,
the antiquated territorial principle established in the S. S. Lotus
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Case and the surfeit of support for it make extraterritorial law
enforcement exceedingly challenging.
For the time being, some methods might be presumed less
offensive to sovereignty. One is to lure a suspect by local or pri-
vate surrogates peacefully into international waters or to a third
state.53  The next issue that should be reconciled is what particular
conditions might justify such extraterritorial arrest activities. This
topic merits future research.
Conclusion
Recent transnational organized criminal activities related to
drug trafficking organizations are on the rise. In addition to drug
trafficking, some examples of these crimes are terrorism, money
laundering, arms trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping, and
ransom. These crimes would certainly have a wide variety of
structures－ corporate-like organizations, socially-bonded54 orga-
nizations based on family ties, religions, ethnicities, etc. － and
modus operandi, such as the different trafficking routes and
equipment, the ability to launder the profits of illicit businesses,
and the extent of association with terrorism.
Still, one of the common denominators is that the offenses
committed by these organizations are prepared, planned, directed,
and controlled in more than one state. That is the very definition
of transnational organized crime. Since the extradition is recog-
nized as the lawful route to take a suspect into custody, it might be
a primary route for gaining custody of suspects to tackle these
insidious and pernicious offenses. At the same time, it might be
crucial to also erect multiple layers of safety net so that a fugitive
cannot escape to a safe haven. 
On the occasion of the indictment of Coke, the United States
Attorney Preet Bharara pointed out that the charges against Coke
patently illustrated, on the one hand, the seriousness of the inter-
national trade of narcotics for firearms, and vice versa, and on the
other, the importance of bringing the criminals to justice, wher-
ever they may be found.55  His brief expression demonstrates the
core of the issues arisen from transnational organized crime.
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麻薬密輸事犯の取締り
－クリストファー・コーク引渡し事案－
大河内　美香
（東京海洋大学海洋科学部海洋政策文化学科）
要旨：　アメリカ合衆国の法執行当局は、同国を仕向地とする麻薬の密輸の増加によって、犯罪人引渡手
続を通じた国際司法協力の必要に迫られている。本研究は、逃亡犯罪人の身柄確保のための手続と、法執
行管轄権の域外適用の射程を、クリストファー・コーク引渡事案を紹介しながら検討する。あわせて引渡
手続以外のオプションとして、公海上又は第三国における逃亡犯罪人の逮捕活動を中心とした域外法執行
の実現可能性を検討する。
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